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1 Introduction 
The unlawful occupation of inner-city buildings in South Africa has led to a number 
of legal disputes between vulnerable occupiers and individual landowners – 
highlighting the direct conflict between individuals' constitutional right not to be 
evicted in an arbitrary manner and property owners' constitutional right not to be 
deprived of property arbitrarily.1 The cause of this tension is a shortage of affordable 
housing options for low-income households in the inner cities, which shows that the 
state is evidently struggling to give effect to its housing obligation.2 In a number of 
recent cases the courts had to decide whether or not to order eviction of the 
unlawful occupiers and thus protect the entitlements of the private owner. The 
essence of the courts' reasoning turned on the obligations of the state in giving 
content to section 26(1) of the Constitution, because it was assumed that any 
interference with private landowners' rights beyond a temporary nature would be 
unjustifiable.3 In all the cases, this assumption was made from the outset without 
any constitutional analysis to determine if a further limitation of the individual 
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1  Ss 26(1) and 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, respectively. 
2  S 26(2) of the Constitution provides that the state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing.  
3  In most instances the courts granted the eviction orders, provided that the state should provide 
alternative accommodation to the evictees.   
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landowner's property rights might be justifiable and non-arbitrary in the 
circumstances of each case. In addition, consideration of the purpose of the 
constitutional property clause in serving the public interest, mainly in relation to the 
creation and implementation of measures that would aid government in giving effect 
to the housing guarantee, was absent from the courts' reasoning.4  
Arguably, a proper analysis of section 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE),5 which gives content to 
section 26(3) of the Constitution,6 might have led to a different outcome in at least 
some of these cases, especially if the circumstances of both the occupiers and the 
landowners had been taken into consideration. Both the personal and socio-
economic circumstances of the occupiers and the circumstances of the landowner 
pertaining to the previous, current and future use of the property should preferably 
form part of the constitutional enquiry. In some instances the temporary limitation of 
the landowner's property rights to allow the state to make alternative housing 
available (the current rule of thumb) might be unjustifiable, while in a different 
scenario, the eviction and relocation of the occupiers might be found to be in 
contravention of the Constitution. In general, the courts can allow, suspend or 
refuse the eviction of unlawful occupiers, provided that the order does not amount 
to an arbitrary deprivation of property. Nevertheless, in some instances the arbitrary 
deprivation of property is inevitable, despite the court's best efforts to protect 
property entitlements. These cases clearly show both the limits of the courts' powers 
in providing adequate solutions to protect owner's property rights while also giving 
                                        
4  In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 16, the Court held 
that part of the purpose of s 25 of the Constitution is to serve the public interest in the sphere of 
land reform, but also in other spheres. 
5  This section provides as follows: "If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for 
more than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order 
for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the 
relevant circumstances, including, except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant 
to a mortgage, whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a 
municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for the relocation of the unlawful 
occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and 
households headed by women." 
6  S 26(3) provides as follows: "No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions." 
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effect to section 26(1) of the Constitution, and the duty of the state to take positive 
Constitution-driven steps.  
The purpose of this article is to scrutinise the courts' decisions in three prominent 
eviction cases in the light of section 25 of the Constitution, to determine if these 
orders amount to arbitrary interferences with the owners' property rights. The 
analysis indicates that the courts' decisions are generally sound if one takes into 
consideration the fact that the courts are inherently limited to a number of orders 
that they may give. Arbitrary deprivations of property occur at the point where the 
courts are unable, due to their inherent limitations, to award an order to protect 
owners' property rights, while the state fails to act. These arbitrary deprivations 
therefore occur as a result of the state's negligence to protect property rights. 
Ironically, the article suggests that in some instances it may be preferable for the 
state to expropriate property as a means to give effect to section 26(1) and to 
protect landowners from arbitrary interferences with their property rights. The 
administrative arm of the state's power to expropriate property in other instances is 
also explored to suggest scenarios when it would be in the public's interest to 
expropriate abandoned inner-city buildings specifically for housing purposes. 
Arguably, this mechanism could have provided a great deal of legal certainty for the 
landowners, occupiers and state in some of the eviction cases. A brief comparative 
analysis with specifically enacted laws aimed at restricting both vacancy rates in the 
inner cities and housing shortages in the Netherlands and England shows to what 
extent other jurisdictions have responded to the problem of vacant buildings amidst 
a housing shortage, while shedding some light on the need for the South African 
legislature and state (in general) to introduce and utilise mechanisms that can start 
to address the housing crises in the inner cities.   
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2 The constitutional right of access to adequate housing 
2.1 Introduction 
The unlawful occupation of privately owned inner-city buildings in South Africa has 
become unexceptional during the past couple of years and has given rise to a 
number of interesting eviction cases.7 The cases highlight a fundamental socio-
economic problem in urban areas, namely that many private owners left their inner-
city buildings to stand vacant and to deteriorate8 during a period of political 
uncertainty at the same time that thousands of desperately poor households were 
struggling to find suitable affordable accommodation in the inner cities, in close 
proximity to their place of work.9 Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in the invasion 
(and unlawful occupation) of vacant buildings or unlawful holding over by occupiers 
who previously occupied the premises lawfully.10 The historical use of the buildings 
and the current aims of the landowners with regard to the future use of their 
buildings often differ,11 although the personal circumstances of the unlawful 
                                        
7  See specifically: The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele 
2010 9 BCLR 911 (SCA) (Shulana Court); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) (Blue Moonlight); Maphango v Aengus 
Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) (Maphango); and City of Johannesburg v 
Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) (Changing Tides).  
8  In Shulana Court, the owner allowed the property to deteriorate while it leased the premises to 
the occupiers. As a result of its dilapidated state, the owner decided to terminate the leases in 
order to renovate the premises: Shulana Court paras 1, 2. The premises in Blue Moonlight 
deteriorated to such an extent that the City issued warning notices to the owner to remedy the 
fire, health and sanitation conditions on the property: Blue Moonlight para 1. The condition of 
the building in Changing Tides was held to be unfit for human habitation, because it was a 
health and safety hazard. The building did not have toilet or ablution facilities, there was no 
water supply or sewage disposal, there were illegal electricity connections and there was 
inadequate ventilation: Changing Tides para 2. 
9  The majority of the occupiers in Shulana Court failed to find suitable alternative accommodation 
in close proximity to where they worked: Shulana Court para 5. The occupiers in Blue Moonlight 
also worked in the informal sector of the Johannesburg central business district and the location 
of their homes was crucial to their livelihoods, since they would not be able to afford 
transportation costs necessitated by living elsewhere and they were unable to find suitable 
alternative accommodation close to their current location: Blue Moonlight para 6. 
10  In most cases the occupiers previously occupied either the current or previous owner's premises 
lawfully. See specifically Shulana Court paras 1, 2; Blue Moonlight para 6; Changing Tides para 
2; and City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 59. 
11  In the majority of cases the landowner indicated that it wanted to redevelop the premises and 
that it had an investment-backed expectation: Shulana Court paras 1, 2; Blue Moonlight para 8; 
and Changing Tides paras 3, 11. The weight attached to the owners' previous and future use of 
the property when considering the correct method and extent of regulation by the state will be 
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
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occupiers and their current needs are generally comparable. In all the cases, the 
occupiers are described as vulnerable and poor with limited job opportunities.12 The 
cases highlight an existing tension between the constitutional property rights13 of the 
owners not to be arbitrarily deprived of property and the occupiers' constitutional 
right of access to adequate housing.14  
The courts are required to strike an equitable balance between these opposing 
rights, which can lead to the limitation of landowners' normal ownership entitlements 
in order to give content to the occupiers' housing rights.15 The question is to what 
extent limitations of this kind can stretch. The overriding consideration in most of 
the eviction disputes is the concern that the eviction order might render the 
occupiers homeless, which diverts the courts' attention towards the section 26(1) 
obligations of the state. The emphasis placed on the obligations of the government 
has introduced a new notion in evictions law, namely that private owners' 
entitlements may be restricted only temporarily to allow the government to provide 
emergency alternative accommodation.16 The desirability of this development is 
questionable, since in some instances landowners should be compelled to carry a 
greater burden than a mere temporary restriction of their right of use. The courts 
are generally unable to provide unlawful occupiers with lawful and secure housing 
rights, although the question of whether or not the state can somehow step in and 
transform the nature of unlawful occupiers' tenure into lawful occupation has not 
been fully explored.  
  
                                        
12  See specifically Shulana Court para 5 and Blue Moonlight para 6. 
13  S 25(1)-(3) of the Constitution legalises state power with regard to the regulation (deprivation) 
and expropriation of private property. 
14  S 26 of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right of access to adequate housing. 
15  Property rights "have to be understood in the context of the need for the ordinarily opening-up 
or restoration of secure property rights for those denied access to or deprived of them in the 
past": Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) 16. 
16  In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 30 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that emergency accommodation is often made available for only "three 
nights per person", while other programmes provide alternative accommodation "for a maximum 
of two weeks". 
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2.2 Case analyses  
A number of laws have been enacted to give content to section 26,17 although these 
laws are focussed on the second part of the provision, which deals with the 
obligations of the state in creating appropriate housing programmes and markets 
that would eventually deliver housing options. To determine the current meaning of 
the right to have access to adequate housing one should examine recent case law, 
bearing in mind that the content of section 26(1) as it currently stands was 
developed as a result of the courts' interpretation of section 26(2).  
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom18 the Constitutional 
Court held that sections 26(1) and 26(2) must be read together and that section 
26(1) places at least a negative obligation on the state (and all other entities and 
individuals) to desist from action that would impair the right of access to adequate 
housing.19 This negative obligation was confirmed in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz20 where the Constitutional Court held that the right of access to 
adequate housing does contain a negative element, which means that "any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing, limits 
the rights protected in section 26(1)".21 Shortly after the Jaftha decision, in President 
                                        
17  For example, the Housing Act 107 of 1997 reflects the government's aim in promoting "housing 
development", which is a key phrase in the Act. S 1(a) generally defines "housing development" 
as the establishment of residential environments in which citizens will have access to residential 
structures with secure tenure. One can infer from the phraseology of the Act that housing 
development is vital in giving effect to ss 26(1) and 26(2). The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 
aims to introduce stability and encourage investment in the rental housing market: Legwaila 
2001 Stell LR 277; Mukheibir 2000 Obiter 326. However, the Act does not promote access to 
rental housing, nor does it to encourage an increase in rental housing stock. In terms of the 
Social Housing Act 16 of 2008, the municipality must take measures to facilitate the delivery of 
social housing within that area and encourage the development of social housing through the 
conversion of existing non-residential stock and the upgrading of existing stock (ss 5(a) and 
5(b)). In terms of s 5(c), the municipality is obliged to provide access to land and buildings for 
social development and to provide access for social housing institutions to municipal rental stock.  
18  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34 per Yacoob 
J. 
19  In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 33 the 
Court rejected the contention that s 26(1) imposed a minimum core obligation on the state. See 
also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 163-173 and Russell "Minimum State Obligations" 11-21. 
20  Jaftha v Scoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
21  Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 34 per Mokgoro J. At paras 
25-26 the Court emphasised that the aim of s 26 in relation to security of tenure had to be 
interpreted against the historical background of apartheid-type evictions and forced removals. 
The state should be allowed to interfere with an individual's access to housing only when it is 
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of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,22 the Constitutional 
Court postponed the eviction of unlawful occupiers from private land until alternative 
accommodation could be provided by the state.23 At this stage the courts were still 
focussing on the government's general obligation in terms of section 26(2) to 
structure the law in such a way that it can accommodate those in need, while 
eviction disputes between private parties remained a private-law matter in which the 
state does not have a direct interest.24 
This position changed when the courts allowed the joinder of the state in private 
eviction proceedings where the eviction order would render the unlawful occupiers 
homeless. In Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court,25 the 
court held for the first time that the interests of the occupiers, the private landowner 
and the state (municipality) would be protected if the state was joined, because the 
state has a duty to provide the evicted occupiers with adequate housing.26 This 
decision significantly impacts on the position of the state, because it now has a 
direct interest in private eviction proceedings if the occupiers might be rendered 
homeless.27 In addition, the decision introduced a more substantive meaning into 
section 26(1) by placing a positive duty on the state to provide alternative housing 
to evictees who might be rendered homeless, which was refined in subsequent case 
law. 
In The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v 
Steele,28 the SCA decided that it would generally not be just and equitable, and 
would therefore be in contravention of sections 4(6) and 4(7) of PIE, to grant an 
                                                                                                                          
justifiable to do so: Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 26, 28. 
See also Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 467. 
22  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 281-286 for a discussion of the case. 
23  The same logic was followed in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga 
Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) and Shulana Court. 
24  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 40 per Yacoob 
J. 
25  Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W). 
26  Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W) para 18. 
27  This duty of the state will be elaborated on in subsequent paragraphs. See also Sailing Queen 
Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W) para 9. 
28  2010 9 BCLR 911 (SCA) (Shulana Court). 
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eviction order where the effect would be to render the occupiers homeless.29 In City 
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd,30 
the Constitutional Court took into consideration a number of factors to determine 
whether the eviction order would be just and equitable or not,31 although it 
eventually decided that regardless of who the evictor is, once the possibility of 
homelessness exists as a result of an eviction order the scenario can be categorised 
as an emergency and the state should provide emergency accommodation.32   
The Court in City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd33 considered the 
requirements for an eviction order listed under section 4(7) of PIE and held that if 
those requirements were met, section 4(8) of PIE mandates the court to award the 
eviction order, provided that no valid defence was raised by the occupier.34 In the 
light of previous case law the Court emphasised that all spheres of government have 
constitutional obligations to give effect to section 26(1), especially when the need 
for housing can be defined as an emergency. This would typically be the case where 
the occupiers would be rendered homeless as a consequence of the eviction order.35 
The section 26 obligations of the government were, however, not linked with the 
initial question of whether the eviction order would be just and equitable.36 The 
needs of the occupiers, and specifically the availability of alternative accommodation, 
could have an influence on the date of the eviction order, but would weigh very little 
when considering whether the eviction order should be granted or not.37 The Court 
                                        
29  Shulana Court paras 14, 16, 18.  
30  2012 2 SA 104 (CC) (Blue Moonlight). 
31  The factors considered by the Court were: a) that the occupiers initially occupied the buildings 
lawfully; b) that Blue Moonlight was aware of the occupiers when it bought the property; c) that 
the eviction order would render the occupiers homeless; and d) that the possibility of 
homelessness did not exist for Blue Moonlight: Blue Moonlight para 39. These considerations 
highlight some differentiation between private owners regarding their use of the property and 
their relationship with the current occupiers. Nevertheless, the Court refrained from incorporating 
these factors in its final analysis and decision. 
32  Blue Moonlight para 92. See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 
(SCA) para 46 for a contradictory statement by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
33  2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) (Changing Tides). 
34  Changing Tides para 12. 
35  However, this does not mean that the right of access to adequate housing is an unqualified right, 
nor does it mean that the local authority's duty to provide alternative accommodation in the 
event of evictions is an unqualified duty: Changing Tides para 15. 
36  Changing Tides para 14. 
37  Changing Tides para 18. 
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decided that the eviction should be carried out without delay and that the City 
should provide temporary alternative accommodation to the evictees on the sheriff's 
schedule. 38  
The effect of these decisions was a general development in eviction law that places 
a restriction on the immediate eviction of vulnerable occupiers if a) the result of the 
eviction order would be to render them homeless and b) the state has not already 
made alternative housing available. An immediate eviction order in such 
circumstances would generally not be just and equitable. To solve this predicament 
and also to refrain from limiting the landowners' property rights unjustifiably, the 
courts oblige the state to provide temporary (emergency) accommodation to the 
evictees. The way in which the courts have reached this outcome is twofold. 
Firstly, they decided that the only method through which the essential right to 
housing can be realised is when the state fulfills its section 26(2) obligation. In the 
eviction cases where the occupiers would likely be rendered homeless as a result of 
the eviction orders, the obligation of the state is interpreted narrowly to mean that 
the local authority should make alternative emergency housing available on an 
interim basis.39 In addition, the landowner's identity, the previous use of the 
property, future plans with regard to the property and the relationship with the 
occupiers are irrelevant, because the courts will disregard these factors when there 
is an emergency situation and place the obligation to prevent an increase in 
homelessness squarely on the local authority.  
Secondly, in Changing Tides it was decided that this obligation of the government, 
specifically the question of whether alternative accommodation should be made 
available, must be distinguished from the initial question, namely whether or not it 
would be just and equitable to grant the eviction order. The question concerning the 
justification of the eviction order must be separated from the obligation to provide 
                                        
38  Changing Tides paras 56-58.  
39  However, the courts also indicated that the other spheres of government should play a role in 
the provision of housing, although the extent to which these spheres' plans, projects and 
budgets can be scrutinised by the courts is limited due to the separation of powers principle. The 
obligations of the three spheres of government and the cooperation between these spheres will 
be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
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housing, because these matters have implications for different role-players. To 
determine whether this narrow approach adopted by the courts is both logically 
sound and in line with the transformative vision of the Constitution, one should first 
consider the obligations of the government in more depth and secondly scrutinise 
the rights (and obligations) of landowners in its section 25 context, which generally 
allows restrictions on landowners' rights for public purposes. 
2.3 Governmental obligations in the inner cities 
In relation to section 26(1), section 26(2) provides that the "state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of this right". The Housing Act 107 of 199740 indicates 
how this duty is distributed between the three spheres of government,41 and that 
these governmental spheres must co-operate with one another in good faith and 
mutual trust in a number of ways, including mutual assistance and support.42 
National and provincial government must support and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and perform 
their functions.43  
In terms of the Housing Act, national government must establish and facilitate the 
national housing development process. The Minister must determine national policy 
in respect of housing, set delivery goals, monitor the performance of provincial and 
local governments in respect of such goals, and support (and strengthen) the 
capacity of municipalities to perform their duties in respect of housing 
development,44 while the provincial government must take all reasonable and 
necessary steps to strengthen the capacity of municipalities to exercise their powers 
and perform their duties in respect of housing development.45 The obligations of 
                                        
40  This Act is the principal act that deals with the provision of housing in South Africa.  
41  Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the three spheres of government are distinct, inter-
dependent and interrelated: s 40(1) of the Constitution. 
42  S 41(1) of the Constitution. 
43  S 154(1) of the Constitution. This forms part of the co-operative government principle. 
44  S 3(1) and 3(2) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
45  S 7(2) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. The provincial government must also intervene on the 
basis of s 139 of the Constitution to ensure performance if a municipality cannot perform its 
duties as outlined in the Act. 
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local government in relation to the provision of housing are staggering.46 Local 
government must take all necessary steps a) to ensure that individuals in its area 
have access to adequate housing on a progressive basis; b) to set appropriate 
housing delivery goals in its area; c) to identify land for housing development; and 
d) to initiate, plan, co-ordinate, facilitate, promote and enable appropriate housing 
development in its area of jurisdiction.47 In relation to emergency housing, section 
12.4.1 read with section 12.6.1(b) of the National Housing Code provides that 
municipalities must initiate and plan projects that relate to emergency housing and, 
if necessary, request assistance from other authorities.48 
The obligation that rests with the government in giving content to section 26(1) is 
undoubtedly a positive obligation in that all the spheres of government must take 
positive steps on a continuous basis to create feasible housing options that are 
accessible to all South Africans. The immensity of this task is overwhelming, but it 
rests on all spheres of government and the local authority should be assisted by the 
other spheres to fulfill its obligations. In the eviction cases, the shortage of housing 
options for the socio-economically weak becomes evident and it shows that the 
government (in all its spheres) is currently failing to fulfill its constitutional and 
statutory obligations in relation to housing. As a result, the courts are faced with the 
impossible task of a) balancing landowners' constitutional right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of property with the constitutional housing rights of the unlawful occupiers; 
b) determining what the actual situation is with regard to the premises in question;49 
                                        
46  One of the objects of local government is to ensure the provision of services ("basic municipal 
services" are defined in s 1 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 as 
municipal services that are necessary to ensure a reasonable quality of life for individuals) to 
communities in a sustainable manner, while municipalities should also structure their planning, 
budgeting and administration processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community: ss 
152 and 153(a) of the Constitution, respectively.  
47  S 9(1) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. The section also includes a number of other duties.  
48  Blue Moonlight para 66. However, the point of departure is that the City must finance its own 
emergency housing scheme, which means that it must plan and budget to accommodate 
evictees in desperate need: Blue Moonlight para 67. 
49  In Blue Moonlight, the court directed the City to compile a report with information "regarding the 
numerous unoccupied inner city buildings and, if State or City owned, whether they were 
deliberately being moth-balled under other urban renewal initiatives:" Eagle Valley Properties 
250 CC v Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg Situated at 124 Kerk Street, 
Johannesburg In re: Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg Situated at 124 Kerk 
Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg [2011] ZAGPJHC 3 para 13. The Court decided in 
Changing Tides that the local authority must file a report with the court detailing the following 
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and c) scrutinising the reasonableness of the government's policies and projects in 
relation to its housing obligation, while complying with the separation of powers 
principle.50 Despite the municipalities' response that they are neither obliged nor able 
to provide accommodation,51 the approach that the courts have followed suggests 
that it will force municipalities to fulfill their constitutional and statutory obligations 
in relation to housing, albeit limited to the occupiers who might be rendered 
homeless in question.  
2.4 Conclusion 
One of the considerations that favoured eviction orders and the concomitant 
relocations to temporary public housing was the decision that any deprivation of the 
landowners' property rights beyond a temporary nature would be unjustifiable.52 The 
courts merely assumed that they had to award the eviction orders for two reasons, 
namely that the obligation to provide housing to the socio-economically weak rests 
on the state and that private owners' property entitlements should generally not be 
limited to a greater extent than is necessary for the state to fulfill its obligations. At 
no point did the courts engage with section 4(7) of PIE to verify that an eviction and 
                                                                                                                          
information: a) its current housing policy; b) any information with regard to the relevant building 
or property in respect of which the order is being sought; c) the municipality's opinion regarding 
the condition of the building, specifically whether it is fit for human habitation; d) information 
relating to the personal circumstances of the occupiers; e) whether an eviction order will render 
the occupiers homeless; f) what steps the municipality will take to alleviate such homelessness; 
and g) what the implications would be for the owner if the eviction order is delayed: para 40. 
50  In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41 the 
Constitutional Court suggested that the role of the courts is not to question the measures 
adopted by the state, but rather to determine if the chosen measures are reasonable. 
51  See for instance Blue Moonlight para 3. At para 32 the City argued that it cannot be held 
accountable for the provision of housing to all persons evicted from privately owned land. 
52  In Blue Moonlight, the Court emphasised that in some instances, especially where the owner was 
aware of the presence of unlawful occupiers when it bought the building, private landowners 
might have to tolerate the temporary presence of such occupiers, but this does not mean that 
owners should provide free housing for an indefinite period: Blue Moonlight paras 34, 35, 39-40. 
This was decided without any real engagement with the social obligations of the landowner as 
enacted in s 25. In Changing Tides, the court decided that private owners might in some 
instances have to be patient when their usual ownership entitlements, including the right to use 
and dispose, are restricted temporarily to accommodate the pressing needs of the occupiers. The 
needs of the occupiers can have an influence on the date of the eviction order, but not the 
question of whether the eviction order should be granted or not: Changing Tides para 18. 
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relocation order would be appropriate.53 Arguably, in some instances private owners 
should carry a greater burden than the courts suggest, depending on the relevant 
circumstances of the landowner and the occupiers (as prescribed by section 4(7) of 
PIE). Nevertheless, the power of the courts to provide some relief for unlawful 
occupiers is still limited in the sense that they can suspend or refuse eviction orders, 
but they are generally unable to change the nature of unlawful occupiers' tenure. 
This indicates both the limits of the courts' powers in providing adequate relief for 
the desperately homeless and the point where the positive duty of the state 
becomes so essential. 
The state has the statutory power to intervene, on its own initiative, and 
accommodate unlawful occupiers on a permanent basis. The state can, for example, 
expropriate property for housing purposes. Section 9(3) of the Housing Act provides 
that a municipality may by notice in the Provincial Gazette expropriate any land 
required by it for the purpose of housing development if a) it is unable to purchase 
the land from the owner after reasonable negotiations; b) it obtained permission 
from the MEC before placing the notice in the Provincial Gazette; and c) the notice is 
published within six months after the MEC granted permission. Consequently, the 
state would acquire the property as the landowner and be able to provide the 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers on a legal basis – the nature of their 
tenure would effectively be transformed. The state would thus give effect to section 
26(1) and (2), while side-stepping eviction and relocation procedures. Of course, 
expropriations of this kind can be extended to vacant inner-city buildings as well and 
                                        
53  This judicial development is not in line with the dictum of Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), namely that "the Constitution imposes new obligations on 
the courts concerning rights relating to property not previously recognised by the common law. 
It counterposes to the normal ownership rights of possession, use and occupation a new and 
equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of a home … The judicial function in these 
circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests 
involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not 
to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and 
the specific factors relevant in each particular case": para 23. The general decision that the 
occupiers should be evicted and relocated is also in conflict with the decision in Jaftha v 
Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) that any measure which deprives an 
occupier of existing access to housing limits the s 26(1) right. It follows that such an approach 
should generally not be followed by the courts. 
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should not be limited to buildings that are already unlawfully occupied. However, all 
interferences with landowners' property rights must pass constitutional muster and 
the constitutionally permissible extent to which the state may interfere will depend 
on the case at hand. 
3 The constitutional rights and obligations of private owners 
3.1 Section 25: a general overview of the relevant provisions 
Section 25 of the Constitution casts the common law entitlements and obligations of 
ownership (often imposed in terms of legislation) in a constitutional light. Sections 
25(1)-(3) read with section 25(4) are of particular importance when considering the 
interaction between the housing obligations of the state mandated in sections 26(1) 
and (2) and its responsibility to refrain from interfering with private property rights 
excessively. The watershed case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance54 (FNB) has shaped our understanding of section 25 
disputes insofar as it gives content and structure to challenges of this kind.55 The 
paragraphs below outline the relevant constitutional provisions and refer to the key 
aspects of the FNB decision. 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution has a dual function. It recognises the state's power 
to regulate the exercise of property entitlements for a public purpose, while it also 
sets two requirements, namely law of general application and non-arbitrariness, 
against which regulatory interference must be measured.56 As a result, deprivations 
– including instances where regulatory interference results in the complete or partial 
destruction of ownership or ownership entitlements – will pass constitutional muster 
                                        
54  2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (FNB). 
55  For a general discussion of FNB refer to Roux "Property" chap 46; Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 854-
878. 
56  Van der Walt Constitutional Property 17, 225-228. Van der Walt argues that a third requirement, 
that of public purpose, can be read into either the requirement of law of general application or 
into the requirement of non-arbitrariness.  
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if they meet the section 25(1) requirements.57 Expropriations are regulated by 
sections 25(2)-(3) of the Constitution58 and are constitutionally permissible if they 
are a) authorised by a law of general application; b) for a public purpose or in the 
public interest;59 and c) subject to the payment of just and equitable 
compensation.60 The term "public interest" includes the nation's commitment to land 
reform and to measures designed to enable equitable access to natural resources.61  
In FNB, the Constitutional Court developed a methodology62 to assess constitutional 
property challenges, which should be understood in the light of the distinction 
between deprivations and expropriations. Deprivations embrace the wider category 
of interference since they include any regulatory control that limits the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of private property.63 Expropriations, by contrast, fall in 
the narrower category of interference and are considered a subspecies of 
deprivation.64 Accordingly, "[t]he starting point for constitutional analysis … for the 
infringement of property rights, must be s 25(1)".65 An essential step in the 
methodology is to determine whether the deprivation is arbitrary because the "law of 
general application" does not provide "sufficient reason" for the particular 
deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair.66 "Sufficient reason" is established 
with reference to eight contextual considerations, centred on the complexity of the 
                                        
57  The state is authorised to regulate the use and exercise of property rights, provided that such 
interference is for a legitimate public purpose and that it is fairly imposed: Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property 214-215. 
58  Refer to Van der Walt Constitutional Property 196-213 for an explanation of the nuanced 
relationship between deprivation and expropriation in South African law.  
59  S 25(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
60  S 25(3) regulates the payment of compensation for expropriation. This section lists specific 
factors that should be taken into account when determining the amount of compensation 
payable. See generally Van der Walt Constitutional Property 334-520.     
61  S 25(4)(a) of the Constitution. 
62  FNB para 46. 
63  FNB para 57. A number of cases, including Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng, 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32 deviated from this 
interpretation of "deprivation". See specifically Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 79-80. 
64  FNB para 57. See further Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 867.  
65  FNB para 60. 
66  FNB para 100. The court did not elaborate on the meaning of procedural fairness for the 
purposes of an s 25(1) enquiry. Refer to Van der Walt Constitutional Property 264-270 for a 
general discussion of procedural fairness. 
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relationships involved in the dispute.67 These considerations are referred to in the 
analysis of the case law below. 
3.2 Inner-city landowners' obligations and entitlements in the context 
of urban decay and the increasing demand for housing 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Ownership consists of rights and obligations that are shaped according to the 
prevailing demands of society.68 Section 25(1) of the Constitution acknowledges 
these obligations, but it also provides two threshold requirements that have to be 
met to prevent disproportionate inroads into ownership entitlements. In the context 
of inner-city evictions, the case law referred to above shows that landowners often 
neglect essential obligations such as paying rates and taxes or maintaining 
structures in accordance with statutory health and safety standards. There are also 
instances where – by attempting to abandon their inner-city properties – landowners 
have shunned all obligations arising from land ownership. These cases highlight the 
unequal distribution of housing resources in South Africa and raise questions 
concerning the obligations of landowners, who form part of a society in the midst of 
a housing crisis. As explained above, in Blue Moonlight69 the Constitutional Court 
unequivocally stated that private landowners cannot be expected to provide free 
                                        
67  FNB para 100. 
68  Even before the coming into operation of the Constitution it was widely recognised that 
landowners have certain responsibilities when exercising ownership entitlements. See for 
instance Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 43-48, who argues that ownership in the South African 
context has never been an absolute right and that it has always had to yield to the demands 
placed on it by society. Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 243-244; 248-249 and 260-262 argues that the 
right to use property has never been unfettered in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, as is 
evidenced by the restrictions placed on ownership entitlements by neighbour law. Likewise, Van 
der Walt 1987 SALJ 476-479 argues with reference to environmental laws that it seems as if the 
concept of landownership in South Africa has changed and "that change implies the limitation of 
ownership by social duties and restrictions deriving from various interests in society" such as the 
public interest in the conservation of the environment. According to Van der Walt it is necessary 
to determine whether ownership in South Africa should be viewed as an "unbound" right which 
can be narrowed down by legislation, or alternatively, whether it should be viewed as an 
inherently limited right. Van der Walt suggests a framework that accommodates the view that 
the limitations imposed on ownership do not amount to "limitations of the owner's theoretically 
unlimited right, but as natural duties and limits inherent in ownership of land as such". 
69  Blue Moonlight para 40. 
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housing to the homeless indefinitely.70 However, they can be forced to tolerate 
within reason the temporary unlawful occupation of their property until such time as 
it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order. As has already been said, the 
courts have generally opted for suspended eviction orders while holding on to the 
traditional understanding that landowners' rights should be limited in the least 
burdensome way. This result may be ascribed to the fact that South African courts 
have the ability to protect constitutional and existing property rights but (with a few 
exceptions that are not relevant here) they do not have the authority to create rights 
that did not exist previously. In the eviction framework, this restricts the courts' 
power in so far as remedies are concerned. 
This section re-examines three prominent cases to identify ownership obligations 
and entitlements stemming from the public's interest in providing housing to the 
poor, while protecting private property rights against unlawful infringements.71 
Against this background, the paragraphs below describe the role of the court not 
only as an arbiter when constitutional rights are in conflict, but also as a functionary 
directly involved in ameliorating the current housing crisis. The section below also 
highlights the existing shortcomings in the government's eviction and informal 
housing policies to show where it is necessary to develop the law in relation to the 
provision of housing. Arguably there are also instances where – instead of 
developing the law – the local government should resort to existing mechanisms, 
such as expropriation, to meet its section 26(1) mandate. In the spirit of FNB, the 
point of departure of this enquiry will be section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
  
                                        
70  Blue Moonlight para 40. 
71  Blue Moonlight para 40. 
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3.2.2 The Olivia Road cases 
In Olivia Road,72 the city requested the Court to evict unlawful occupiers from three 
inner-city private properties.73 The buildings, consisting of a 16-storey residential 
building, a retail building and a high-rise structure, had been abandoned74 and were 
in a particularly derelict state.75 Most of the occupiers were destitute and earned 
very little income, if any.76 Many of the occupiers had been living on the properties 
for years77 and had developed livelihood strategies focused on income-earning 
opportunities and activities in the city and surrounds.78 Counsel for the city argued 
that eviction would promote public health and safety and prevent further urban 
decay. The occupiers opposed the application on various grounds, including that 
eviction would violate their section 26 rights.79   
The Court reiterated that eviction was fundamentally a constitutional matter80 and 
that  the city's statutory duties had to be reconciled with – as opposed to insulated 
                                        
72  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W); City of Johannesburg v 
Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 2008 3 SA 208 
(CC). For a discussion of these cases refer to Strydom Demolition Orders 64-77. 
73  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 4. The city relied on s 
12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (Building 
Standards Act) in support of its eviction application.  
74  Refer to Sonnekus 2004 TSAR 747-757 for an overview of the legal implications of abandoning 
land in South Africa. 
75  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 13- 20. At paras 5 and 
23 the court explained that these buildings were classified as bad buildings and evacuation was 
one of the first steps of the Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration Strategy. See City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 21 for information on this 
strategy. 
76  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 20.  
77  In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 29 the court 
emphasised that occupiers who resided on properties for years had to be treated with more 
sympathy than occupiers who deliberately invaded buildings to disrupt the municipality's housing 
scheme.  
78  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 20, 57. From the 
outset the court made it apparent that relocation to an informal settlement (situated on the 
outskirts of Johannesburg) was not a viable solution as this would deprive the occupiers of their 
means of earning an income. Unfortunately, this meant that once evicted, the occupiers would 
become homeless, or simply move on to another vacant building, as there was no suitable, long-
term alternative accommodation in the city. 
79  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 11, 12. Refer to 
Strydom Demolition Orders 64-76 for a discussion of the other grounds on which the occupiers 
opposed the eviction order. 
80  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 26. 
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from – its section 26 duties.81 The Court found that the city had failed to prioritise 
the housing needs of indigent persons who reside in dangerous and unsuitable 
inner-city structures.82 Consequently, the Court found that the occupiers could not 
be evicted until the city either implemented a comprehensive housing plan or 
provided alternative housing.83  
The Supreme Court of Appeal84 ordered the eviction on condition that the city 
provided alternative, temporary housing for the occupiers, and85 held that the city 
had a "special duty" towards the homeless. At the very least, this duty meant that 
the city had to provide temporary accommodation for occupiers rendered homeless 
as a result of the eviction.86  
The Constitutional Court ordered the parties to meaningfully engage with each other 
to reach an agreement regarding the eviction, and to determine if the buildings 
could be made more safe and healthy on a temporary basis.87 It was agreed that the 
occupiers would vacate the premises if the municipality provided alternative 
accommodation in other buildings, pending more permanent housing solutions 
developed by the city in consultation with the occupiers.88  
3.2.3 Blue Moonlight 
In Blue Moonlight the landowner sought to evict 86 unlawful occupiers89 from a 
commercial property that it had purchased in 2004 for redevelopment purposes.90 
                                        
81  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 26.  
82  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 50, 65-67.  
83  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 67.  
84  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA). 
85  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 78. 
86  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 47.  
87  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 5, 25. 
88  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 26.  
89  The occupiers consisted of 81 adults (two adults were pensioners) and 5 children, one of whom 
was disabled. There were also many households headed by women. See Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) paras 63-78 for the 
facts of the case.  
90  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) 
paras 18-20. The property had been used as a carpet factory until 1999. Many of the occupiers 
were employed by the business and were allowed to live on the premises provided they paid 
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These occupiers were extremely poor and would become homeless if evicted.91 From 
the outset it was apparent that there was a direct relationship between the location 
of the building and the occupiers' ability to earn an income.  
As in all private eviction disputes, the enquiry centred on the landowner's section 
25(1) rights;92 the occupiers' section 26(3) rights – as given effect to by section 4 of 
PIE; and their section 26(1)-(2)93 rights of access to adequate housing. The Court 
held that property rights were not completely unfettered and that it could, 
depending on the circumstances, delay the enforcement of an eviction order 
temporarily.94 However, local authorities had to meet their section 26(1) housing 
duties without transferring their social housing responsibilities onto private 
landowners, as this would nullify the institution of ownership.95 Expropriation was 
raised as an option during argument, but the Court held that it did not have the 
power to grant such an order.96 As such, it granted the eviction order97 but 
postponed its operation for two months and ordered the city to pay constitutional 
damages to the landowner.98 
                                                                                                                          
rent. The factory closed down and from 1999 to 2005 the occupiers paid rent to persons 
ostensibly collecting on behalf of first the landowner and later Blue Moonlight, who denied ever 
receiving rent from the occupiers. See Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of 
Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) para 12 and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) paras 9-11. 
91  Blue Moonlight para 6. The city had filed a report with the court in which it insisted that it would 
not provide alternative accommodation to persons evicted from private property: Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) para 32. 
92  In this regard, the court explained that the right to property was an "essential foundational stone 
of a democratic state" and that the arbitrary seizure of property without compensation, as under 
the apartheid regime, undermined core democratic values. See Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) paras 93-94, 107. 
93  The court reiterated that s 26(2) of the Constitution does not envision laws that "effectively 
expropriate" landowners of their common law property rights indefinitely for social housing 
purposes. See Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) para 98. 
94  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) 
paras 101-103. 
95  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) 
para 135. 
96  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) 
paras 155-160. 
97  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) 
paras 194-195.  
98  This order was set aside in the Supreme Court of Appeal on the grounds that Blue Moonlight 
differed from Modderklip in several respects. See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
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The Constitutional Court confirmed that its decision to suspend the eviction order 
amounted to a deprivation of property99 and that a landowner could not be deprived 
of its property rights permanently. However, the owner's right to use his property 
might be limited "in the process of the justice and equity enquiry mandated by 
PIE".100 A range of factors could have a bearing on the just-and-equitable enquiry. 
The Court placed emphasis on the fact that the occupiers had lawfully resided on the 
land for some years. Moreover, Blue Moonlight had purchased the property knowing 
that it was occupied and that it may have some difficulty in evicting the occupiers. 
The eviction order would undoubtedly have rendered the occupiers homeless, while 
there was no competing risk that Blue Moonlight would be rendered homeless 
because of the eviction order.101 The Court also considered if alternative land or 
accommodation could be made available to the occupiers once they were evicted.102  
The Court held that the city's housing policy was unconstitutional insofar as it 
excluded persons evicted from private property from accessing its temporary 
housing programme.103 It ordered the city to provide temporary accommodation to 
the occupiers fourteen days before they would be evicted.104 In the meantime Blue 
Moonlight had to be patient, as the city had to be given reasonable time to comply 
with the court order.105  
  
                                                                                                                          
v Blue Moonlight 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 70 and the discussion in Strydom Demolition Orders 
84-85. 
99  Blue Moonlight para 37. The Court also made it clear that the deprivation would pass 
constitutional muster, which meant that the deprivation was non-arbitrary. 
100  Blue Moonlight para 40. 
101  Blue Moonlight para 39. Blue Moonlight had an economic interest in the property. In some cases 
an eviction order might be sought to enable a family to reoccupy their home. This was clearly 
not the case for Blue Moonlight. 
102  Blue Moonlight para 41. 
103  Blue Moonlight para 97. 
104  Blue Moonlight para 101. 
105  Blue Moonlight para 100. The court confirmed the findings of the Supreme Court of Appeal in all 
material respects. Refer to the discussion in Strydom Demolition Orders 84-85. 
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3.2.4 Modderklip 
Modderklip owned a large tract of agricultural land adjacent to an informal 
settlement. In October 2000 approximately 18000 persons took up residence on the 
land.106 The owner launched an application for an eviction and the order was 
granted in 2001.107 Modderklip enlisted the sheriff to execute the eviction order, but 
later abandoned this strategy as it could not afford the deposit to secure the cost of 
the eviction.108  
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the court a quo's finding that Modderklip's 
section 25(1) rights and the occupiers' section 26(1) and (2) rights had been 
breached.109 Furthermore, the Court held that Modderklip's right to equal protection 
by the law (section 9(2) of the Constitution) had been undermined by the state's 
failure to assist in safeguarding Modderklip's property rights.110 However, removing 
the occupiers had become an impractical solution.111 In the alternative, expropriation 
would have been an appropriate solution, but it was not within the Court's power to 
make such an order.112 Consequently, the Court found that constitutional damages 
would be an appropriate remedy since it had the added advantage that the 
occupiers could remain on the land for the time being.113 The Court explained that 
                                        
106  Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) (Modderklip) 
paras 2-3. By the time the case was heard in the court a quo it was estimated that nearly 40 000 
persons had occupied the land unlawfully.  
107  Modderklip paras 2-3. By the time the eviction order was granted the occupiers had established a 
more formal township with streets, numbered homes and fenced-off erven.   
108  Modderklip para 4-7. The sheriff estimated that to remove the occupiers with the help of a 
security company would cost R 1.8 Million. This amount exceeded the value of the property. 
Modderklip also unsuccessfully approached the police, the Minister of Safety and Security, the 
President, the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs and the Department of Housing for 
assistance to enforce the order.  
109  Modderklip para 21. 
110  Modderklip para 31. The court expressed the view that Modderklip had not been treated equally 
as it had the burden to accommodate 40 000 people on its private property. 
111  Modderklip para 41. Modderklip did propose to the municipality that the property should be 
expropriated, but the municipality elected not to proceed. 
112  Modderklip para 41. 
113  Modderklip para 42.  
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this extraordinary remedy was under the circumstances the only way in which the 
interests of justice would be served.114  
3.2.5 Three categories of owners 
3.2.5.1 Introduction 
In the context of private inner-city evictions, one can roughly identify three types of 
landowners. Firstly, there are landowners who, as in Olivia Road, have allowed their 
structures to deteriorate, have failed to pay rates and taxes for some time, and who 
have subsequently attempted to abandon their properties.115 In these instances 
eviction orders are usually sought by the local authority on the basis of health and 
safety concerns. Secondly, there are landowners, as in Blue Moonlight, who hold 
land for investment or development purposes and who have negligently allowed the 
premises to become unlawfully occupied in the interim, or who have purchased an 
already unlawfully occupied property.  Finally, there are landowners, as in 
Modderklip, who for reasons beyond their control are burdened with the continuous 
unlawful occupation of their land, a state of affairs that may affect their section 
25(1) rights. Subsequent paragraphs analyse whether the courts' decisions in these 
cases amounted to arbitrary interferences with the owners' property rights and, if 
not, whether other factors might have caused an unconstitutional deprivation. The 
constitutionality of the deprivation therefore comes into play only once a court has 
decided that a) it will grant the eviction order but postpone its implementation, or b) 
that it is not just and equitable to grant an eviction order at all. Once a court has 
reached a decision the resulting consequences for the landowners should be 
considered in the light of section 25(1).116 
                                        
114  Modderklip paras 44-45. The Court ordered a damages enquiry to determine the nature and 
value of such an award within the framework of s 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. This 
order was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, who held that the state had transferred its 
housing duties on a private landowner. The Court held that constitutional damages constituted a 
suitable remedy considering that the occupiers were a settled community and that Modderklip 
had repeatedly requested state assistance to no avail. See President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
115  See for instance Changing Tides. 
116  On a theoretical level, this approach finds support in Radin's property for personhood theory, 
which proposes a hierarchy of entitlements based on her distinction between personal and 
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3.2.5.2 Blue Moonlight and Modderklip 
By way of a comparison between Modderklip and Blue Moonlight and with reference 
to the FNB substantive arbitrariness test, the paragraphs below show that in some 
instances the continued unlawful occupation of landowners' properties as a result of 
the failure of the state to act or the suspension of an eviction order may amount to 
an arbitrary deprivation of property, but in other cases it may be constitutionally 
acceptable to permit the temporary unlawful occupation of private land. In this 
regard, it is argued that from a constitutional perspective there is a shortcoming in 
South African law in so far as it does not adequately protect landowners from being 
arbitrarily deprived of their property, and in particular their use entitlement where an 
eviction order cannot be granted or enforced.117 There are also occasions where, as 
in Olivia Road, an expropriation order for social housing purposes would better serve 
the public interest since such an order would create more legal certainty and 
broaden the social housing base. The FNB analysis shows that in Olivia Road-type 
cases the law is lacking insofar as it does not reflect the public's interest in utilising 
abandoned buildings for social housing purposes. In Blue Moonlight and Modderklip, 
eviction orders were awarded, but the implementation of the respective orders was 
delayed or postponed. In both instances the courts also ordered constitutional 
damages to alleviate potentially disproportionate interferences with property rights, 
but this order was later set aside in the case of Blue Moonlight. In essence, it seems 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Blue Moonlight118 came to the conclusion that 
the Modderklip landowner would have been arbitrarily deprived of his property but 
for the constitutional damages award. By contrast, the Blue Moonlight landowner 
                                                                                                                          
fungible property.  According to Radin, personal property – property closely connected to our 
personhood – should be more stringently protected that fungible property that is mostly owned 
for financial or economic reasons. The implication of this approach is that if two parties hold 
interests in the same property, one a personal interest (such as the unlawful occupiers' interest 
in the shelter provided by an inner-city structure) and the other a fungible interest (such as the 
landowner's investment interest in the occupied structure), the personal interest should probably 
override the fungible interest. Radin acknowledges that – as in the eviction context – personal 
property is not always owned by the persons who have come to rely on it for their survival. See 
Radin 1981 Stan L Rev 1015. For a critique of Radin's work refer to Schnably 1993 Stan L Rev 
347-407. 
117  In the discussion below we argue that the deprivation in Modderklip was arbitrary because there 
was not sufficient reason for the deprivation. To soften the blow of the arbitrary deprivation, the 
Court granted compensation. 
118  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA). 
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had a social responsibility to bear the unlawful occupation of its land – without 
compensation – until such time as the eviction order could be enforced.119 This 
deprivation120 was arguably in line with section 25(1).  
FNB requires of the courts to consider the complexity of the relationships involved in 
the dispute. The following considerations would be relevant in the Blue Moonlight 
analysis: the occupiers lawfully occupied the property initially and continued to pay 
rent for some time; Blue Moonlight purchased the property knowing that it had to 
evict the occupiers before redeveloping the land and there was a delay on the part 
of Blue Moonlight in instituting eviction proceedings.121 Under these circumstances, 
Blue Moonlight should have anticipated that it would not necessarily obtain an 
immediate eviction order.122 In contrast, Modderklip was the victim of a massive land 
invasion and it actively pursued an eviction order to protect its property rights from 
the outset, but was unsuccessful because the state failed to support its efforts. 
Modderklip also approached different levels of state authority for assistance, to no 
avail. By the time Modderklip approached the Supreme Court of Appeal it had 
exhausted all its remedies.  
FNB directs the courts to consider the relationship between means (deprivation) and 
ends (the purpose of the deprivation). In addition, one must refer to the effect that 
the deprivation will have on the landowner and the relationship between the nature 
of the property and the extent and purpose of the deprivation. The purpose of the 
deprivation in Blue Moonlight was to protect the occupiers' section 26 rights, which 
were arguably upheld since the delay in eviction afforded the local authority time to 
show to the Court how it would accommodate the occupiers evicted from private 
                                        
119  The landowner initiated eviction proceedings in May 2006 and obtained an eviction order in April 
2012. See Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 
470 (W) para 1 and Blue Moonlight para 104. Therefore, the owner had to bear the occupation 
of its property for nearly 6 years. 
120  This deprivation was caused by the court's decision to enforce the eviction order only once it had 
found that it was just and equitable under the circumstances. Therefore, the source of the 
deprivation was the exercise of the court's discretion as authorised by s 4 of PIE. 
121  Blue Moonlight paras 8-10.  
122  In terms of Radin's property for personhood theory the Blue Moonlight occupiers had a personal 
interest in the property, which would at least temporarily have taken precedence over the 
landowner's fungible interest. The function of the court in this regard was to preserve the 
personal interest in the property until the occupiers could be accommodated elsewhere. See 
Radin 1981 Stan L Rev 957-1015. 
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land.123 It was the Court's intention to compel the city to reconsider and restructure 
its existing resources and housing policies more actively. This measure was 
necessary to facilitate the dynamic involvement of the city in resolving the inner-city 
housing shortage. The delay in eviction may have had undesirable consequences – 
including financial repercussions – for Blue Moonlight, but these fungible interests 
warranted less protection than the occupiers' personal interests in the property.124 
This deprivation was extensive, but it restricted Blue Moonlight's rights only 
temporarily. The Modderklip deprivation may initially have been to uphold the 
occupiers' section 26(3) right, but it soon resulted in the indefinite outright transfer 
of government's duties under section 26(1) and (2) to a private landowner. This 
deprivation eradicated most if not all of Modderklip's ownership entitlements 
permanently as a result of the local authority's failure to give effect to the 
suspended eviction order. 
In terms of FNB the court must consider the extent of the deprivation with regard to 
the property. Due to the sheer number of occupiers, the lack of suitable alternative 
accommodation to house the occupiers, the cost of enforcing the eviction order and 
the indifference of the state representatives, there was no practical way in which the 
Modderklip eviction order could ever have been enforced. In Blue Moonlight the 
landowner could easily evict the occupiers once the Court declared the eviction order 
enforceable. Given the significant purpose of the deprivation (protecting the 
interests of vulnerable and poor occupiers) and the circumstances under which Blue 
Moonlight purchased the property, this deprivation does not appear to be an 
excessive interference with property rights. Modderklip, by comparison, asserted its 
rights without delay and despite its best efforts could not enforce the eviction order. 
Moreover, the local authority rejected the possibility of expropriating the land, while 
                                        
123  Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 745-820 argues that there are social obligations inherent in 
ownership. Alexander's argument is rooted in the Aristotelian notion that human beings will 
flourish if they belong to a group or community. According to Alexander, a landowner must give 
to his community that which its members need in order to flourish. In this regard, he explains 
that "[t]he major claim here, in short, is that our (and others') dependence creates, for us (and 
for them), an obligation to participate in and support the social networks and structures that 
enable us to develop those human capabilities that make human flourishing possible". One social 
obligation relating to human flourishing is that the landowner may not use his property in a 
manner that is detrimental to the broader community. 
124  See the explanation in footnote 122. 
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the likelihood of selling the land to a third party – even at a below-market value – 
was probably rather slim.  
According to FNB there have to be more compelling reasons to justify an 
interference with property rights if the interference embraces all (and not just some) 
of the incidents of ownership or where the property is land. Taking into account the 
centrality of the availability of land in the inner-city and the concomitant issue of 
homelessness in the post-apartheid context, the purpose fulfilled by the deprivation 
in Blue Moonlight was, under the circumstances, more important than the protection 
of the landowner's use entitlement.125 By contrast, the Modderklip deprivation 
amounted to the appropriation of land in a manner that directly conflicted with the 
values enunciated by the Constitutional Court.126  
In line with FNB, and with reference to the considerations raised above, and in 
particular the nature and extent of the relevant deprivations, it is arguably safe to 
conclude that sufficient reason had to be established in Blue Moonlight and 
Modderklip with reference to a proportionality enquiry. The interplay of factors in 
Blue Moonlight suggests that there was a proportional relationship between the 
deprivation (the temporary delay in eviction proceedings) and the purpose of the 
interference with property rights, namely to ensure that the occupiers would be 
treated with compassion and afforded time to find alternative accommodation. 
                                        
125  In the South African context the landowner's social obligations should also be understood in the 
context of the constitutional matrix described in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 14-24. In a nutshell, this matrix requires of landowners and courts to 
be cognizant of the fact that the housing shortage and land hunger can at least partially be 
ascribed to apartheid-era injustices. In the constitutional era property rights will be protected 
from arbitrary interferences, but they will not always trump rights such as those embodied in s 
26(1)-(3), that were previously disregarded under apartheid. 
126  In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 20-22 the court held 
that there are three features of the way that the Constitution addresses the relationship between 
land hunger, homelessness and property rights. Firstly, the Constitution advocates the 
progressive realisation of the right to housing and an orderly process of land reform. The 
Constitution does not allow the arbitrary confiscation of land by either the state or the landless. 
Secondly, s 26(3) does not prohibit the eviction of people if the eviction would result in the loss 
of a home. Thirdly, the courts are expected to formulate concrete and case-specific solutions, 
and the way in which the courts must "manage the process has, accordingly, been left as wide 
open as constitutional language could achieve, by design and not by accident, by deliberate 
purpose and not by omission".  
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Therefore, one can conclude that there was sufficient reason for the deprivation, as 
required by section 25(1).  
However, in the context of Modderklip there was a disproportionate relationship 
between the deprivation – the permanent seizure of land for informal housing 
purposes – and the purpose of the interference, namely upholding section 26(1) and 
(2) rights, a duty that should ultimately be borne by the state. Considering the 
extent of the deprivation, namely the indefinite mass invasion of private property 
and the fact that this deprivation was a result of the general failure of the state to 
fulfil its section 26 duties – one can conclude that there was insufficient reason for 
the limitation of Modderklip’s property rights. The state's failure to give effect to the 
eviction order resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of Modderklip's property and would 
not have survived scrutiny under section 25(1). The only way in which the courts 
could restore the balance was by granting constitutional damages to soften the blow 
of an otherwise unconstitutional interference with property rights, until such time 
when the occupiers could either be removed or the property expropriated. This order 
served to bring an otherwise arbitrary deprivation of property in line with the 
Constitution.127 Of course, the arbitrary deprivation in Modderklip was brought about 
by the state's inadequacy to protect Modderklip's property rights and not the 
decision of the court – the court ordered the eviction. The limits of the courts' power 
in rectifying arbitrary deprivations and consequently protecting owners' property 
rights are evident in this case. In Blue Moonlight the origin of the deprivation was 
the court's decision to grant a suspended eviction order, which was non-arbitrary. 
Blue Moonlight and Modderklip show the pull between landowners' social obligations 
and property entitlements in the framework provided by section 25(1) of the 
                                        
127  Van der Walt explains that the constitutional damages order in this case is comparable to the 
German equalisation payment. Equalisation payments are not compensation for the expropriation 
of property or delictual damages, but a payment of money to lessen the unequal burden 
imposed on ownership rights by the otherwise legitimate and lawful regulation of property. In 
essence, the equalisation payment alleviates the burden imposed by the statutory regulation of 
property and in so doing it prevents such regulation from being rendered excessive, 
unconstitutional and invalid. Importantly, equalisation payments differ from constitutional 
damages in that an equalisation amount is awarded in terms of specific authorising legislation. 
See specifically Van der Walt Constitutional Property 277-280; Van der Walt 1999 SAPL 288-290; 
Alexander Global Debate 120-12; and Hofman "Eigentumsgarantie" Rdn 40.  
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Constitution. Blue Moonlight illustrates that in the constitutional era new obligations 
may be imposed on landowners, that did not exist previously. Depending on the 
circumstances, the public interest may require that the landowner tolerate the 
temporary unlawful occupation of his property to enable the state to give effect to 
the occupiers' section 26 rights. It is the function of the court to determine when it 
may not be just and equitable to grant the eviction order at all or when it may be 
necessary to delay the order's implementation. The court has the authority to 
protect unlawful occupiers' interim housing interests, but it also has the power to 
intervene when an individual landowner is forced to bear a social burden that should 
arguably be borne by the public at large. This is usually done by means of an 
eviction order. However, Modderklip demonstrates that an eviction order will not 
always suffice to protect a landowner's property rights and that in these instances it 
may be necessary to find other mechanisms, such as constitutional damages or 
statutorily created equalisation payments to ensure that regulatory interferences 
with property rights do not fall foul of section 25(1).128 Apart from Modderklip, there 
has been little indication of when a court would be willing to grant constitutional 
damages to protect property rights. There is a shortcoming in South African law 
insofar as it does not incorporate statutory measures designed to mitigate excessive 
losses caused by otherwise lawful regulatory action in terms of legitimate regulatory 
laws.129 Development in this area of law is necessary to cater for the circumstances 
where it is not just and equitable to grant an eviction order, but where the continued 
occupation of private property will be substantively arbitrary and thus 
unconstitutional. 
3.2.5.3 Olivia Road 
Olivia Road differs from Blue Moonlight and Modderklip in that the landowner did not 
play a role in the eviction proceedings at all. The Olivia Road buildings were 
abandoned and in such a derelict state that the local authority deemed it necessary 
                                        
128  Essentially, the court may elect to protect the landowner's property rights by way of a liability 
rule (the payment of constitutional damages) instead of a property rule (the eviction of the 
unlawful occupiers). See in this regard Calabresi and Melamed 1972 Harv L Rev 1089-1128. 
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to evict the unlawful occupiers on health and safety grounds. The court's decision to 
evict the occupiers was therefore warranted, since anything to the contrary would 
have overlooked the immediate threat of the unsafe buildings. In fact, it is difficult to 
imagine a more appropriate route that the court could have taken in this case. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the local authority could not have done more.  
The facts in Olivia Road provide the ideal example of when the state should take 
positive measures to address the deterioration of inner-city buildings, while providing 
housing solutions for the homeless. Arguably, the local authority could have 
expropriated the buildings in terms of section 9(3) of the Housing Act, which 
empowers the local authority to expropriate land for housing purposes. What 
remains to be considered is the question of whether such an expropriation would be 
in the public interest and the amount of compensation that should be paid. 
The seemingly harsh consequences of the expropriation should be viewed in the 
light of the ever-growing housing shortage prevalent in urban areas, the public's 
interest in the upgrading of decaying urban structures, and the general renewal of 
the inner city. The public has an interest in secure and healthy urban environments. 
On a theoretical level, the expropriation would highlight the principle that inner-city 
housing is a scare resource and that the public interest is averse to protecting 
absentee landowners' property rights if their decaying buildings can be restored to 
form part of low-income housing stock.130 This is exactly what the local authority 
should aim to accomplish, namely to protect scarce resources that are vital to 
individuals' livelihoods. In addition, the local authority's decision would also 
accommodate the occupiers in their current location, therefore side-stepping their 
permanent eviction and relocation. The provision of adequate long-term housing 
solutions to the desperately poor in areas that are vital to their livelihoods is 
undoubtedly in the public interest, because it gives effect to section 26(1) of the 
                                        
130  Arguably, the ownership of an inner-city building is accompanied by a range of social obligations, 
including the duty to prevent the building from falling into a state of disrepair. These social 
obligations should be understood with reference to Alexander's social obligation norm. When 
exercising ownership entitlements a landowner has the duty to refrain from causing harm to his 
community, for instance by permitting a building to become a health and safety risk, or by 
allowing a structure to stand vacant if he has no intention to use the building in future and 
where it can be used for social housing purposes. See the explanation in footnote 127 above. 
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Constitution. The expropriation of the buildings has the potential to greatly improve 
the lives of the residents of the Olivia Road buildings or the recipients of 
accommodation in upgraded housing schemes, since there is a dire need of housing 
in the inner city.131  
The housing shortage should be understood in the context of the existence in South 
Africa of vast socio-economic inequalities, acute poverty and landownership patterns 
that are inherently skewed by previous racial segregationist policies. It is therefore in 
the public interest to rectify past injustices and the previously dispossessed (such as 
the unlawful occupiers) should be on the receiving end of our constitutional 
transformation process in terms of which access to adequate housing is guaranteed. 
In the light of the nature of the properties (as said in the previous paragraph) and 
the profile of the occupiers, there are undeniably sufficient grounds to justify 
expropriations of this kind.  
Finally, the landowner in Olivia Road attempted to abandon its properties to escape 
statutory responsibilities, such as paying rates and taxes, and the question remains 
whether compensation at below market value would be just and equitable. If the 
parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation, the court must calculate an 
amount that reflects an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, while both the relevant circumstances and the factors in 
section 25(3) must be used to establish this balance. The factors are a) the current 
use of the property; b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; c) the 
market value of the property; d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in 
the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and e) the 
purpose of the expropriation. In terms of section 12 of the Expropriation Act, the 
market value of the expropriated property is the primary standard used to calculate 
compensation, but the Constitution merely lists this factor as one of many that 
should be used to determine compensation. Even though market value should not be 
the core principle to establish compensation, some courts continue to focus on 
                                        
131  The recipients of accommodation in social housing schemes have a personal interest in the 
properties that will be expropriated. With reference to Radin's property for personhood theory 
one may argue that these personal interests should trump the landowners' fungible interest in 
the property. 
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market value since it is the only easily quantifiable value.132 The current use of the 
property can influence the amount of compensation, although not as a punitive 
measure to punish the owner for not using his property in a certain way.133 If the 
purpose of the expropriation is land reform, some authors have argued that the 
compensation should be lower.134  
Arguably, the compensation should in accordance with section 25(2)(b) and (3) of 
the Constitution reflect the fact that the properties have been abandoned and that 
the owner has shunned its social obligations arising from landownership. In 
particular, it would be necessary to take into account that there are unpaid rates and 
taxes in relation to the properties, that the buildings have become a public nuisance 
and that it will require extensive government investment before the structure may 
be used for housing purposes. In theory, the amount of the compensation paid 
should arguably mirror the fact that the public is disinclined to protect property 
rights on behalf of absentee landowners if these properties can be used to give 
effect to section 26 of the Constitution.  
3.3 A summary of the functions and powers of the state and courts in 
the inner-city housing context 
The paragraphs above drew a distinction between the interests of three types of 
landowners to show the instances where, in the eviction and housing context, it 
would be necessary to regulate property rights more extensively and the instances 
where the court would have to protect private property rights either by granting an 
eviction order (the property rule) or by making a constitutional damages award (the 
liability rule). The analysis above also demarcated the functions of the courts and 
the local authorities and the measures that they may take to counter the inner-city 
housing shortage. Blue Moonlight shows that it is within the court's power to delay 
the eviction of unlawful occupiers until it is just and equitable to enforce such an 
order. The purpose of this delay is to ensure that when the eviction takes place, it is 
done in accordance with the values of the Constitution. This delay also affords the 
                                        
132  City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 1 (SCA) par 19. 
133  Budlender "Constitutional Protection" 48, 59; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 512. 
134  See specifically Badenhorst 1998 De Jure 263. 
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local authorities time to find suitable alternative accommodation for the evicted 
occupiers. Unlike the courts, the local authorities have the statutory authority to 
create legal rights by expropriating decaying inner-city structures for low-income 
housing purposes. Section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act makes provision for a 
municipality to expropriate land by notice in the Provincial Gazette if it is required for 
the purposes of a housing development. This provision enables the local authority to 
identify and take action against bad buildings. It is therefore not necessary for the 
legislature to enact specific legislation for this purpose.135 Through this mechanism 
the state would be able to acquire housing stock and house the vulnerable without 
having to evict and rehouse the occupiers.136 In the housing context, the local 
authority is primarily responsible for citizens’ housing needs and the courts have 
recently reiterated this obligation. In terms of the Housing Act, local government 
should identify land for housing development and manage the actual land use and 
development.137 The initiation of these types of expropriations therefore rests with 
the local authority. By exercising this power the local authority will also facilitate the 
gradual rebirth of the inner city and it will convey the message that there are certain 
social obligations inherent in ownership. These social obligations include the 
responsibility to ensure by meeting the standards set in legislation that buildings do 
not become unlawfully occupied or pose health and safety risks. In instances such as 
Olivia Road, the absentee landowner has the social obligation to submit to the 
public's interest when the local authority expropriates the building for housing 
purposes.  
These measures can go a long way towards alleviating the inner-city housing 
shortage. The power of expropriation in particular has been under-utilised by the 
local authorities, perhaps because of financial restraints. The amount of 
compensation paid for the expropriation of Olivia Road-type properties should be off-
set by the outstanding rates and taxes and should reflect the fact that the landowner 
attempted to abandon the property. The expropriated properties can also be 
                                        
135  The courts are generally not involved in the administrative action of the state when it decides to 
expropriate property. The courts would become involved only if the owner challenged the state’s 
decision on the basis that it is unconstitutional. 
136  See s 2.3 above for the role of the local authority regarding its housing obligations. 
137  S 9(1)(a), 9(1)(c) and 9(1)(h). 
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transferred to third-party developers or social housing institutions, which may 
renovate the structures and make it available for social housing. Expropriation is a 
robust solution, and it may be necessary to refine the role that this power may play 
in the inner-city housing context in future. In this regard, it is imperative to consider 
how other jurisdictions have responded to both housing shortages and vacant inner-
city buildings.  
4 Comparative law 
4.1 Dutch Leegstandwet 
In terms of the Dutch criminal code138 it is a crime (known as huisvredebreuk) to 
unlawfully enter and remain in a house, venue or stand used by someone else.139 
Despite this prohibition against squatting, for years homeless persons in the 
Netherlands have taken possession of vacant business and residential buildings for 
housing purposes.140 During the 1960s141 the tension that developed between 
homeless persons' housing needs and the fact that numerous buildings stood vacant 
gave rise to a number of politically-inspired squatting actions.142 During this period 
the Netherlands experienced severe housing shortages143 and squatting was 
therefore not only a political activity but a socio-economic activity as well, since most 
of the squatters were in fact in desperate need of housing.144 On the other hand, the 
owners left their buildings vacant for speculation purposes but did not altogether 
                                        
138  S 138 of the Wetboek van Strafrecht. 
139  Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 49. Dutch private law allows the owners to institute eviction 
proceedings against unlawful occupiers, but some owners have found it impossible to make use 
of civil proceedings as a result of the requirement of citation. Occupiers remain anonymous and 
consequently force the owners to make use of criminal proceedings. See also Van der Walt 1991 
Recht en Kritiek 334. 
140  Priemus 2011 Enhr Conference Paper 1. This should not come as a surprise, since a housing 
shortage, combined with ample empty property is the ideal condition for squatting: Pruijt 2003 
Int J Urban Reg Res 133. 
141  Currently squatting is illegal in the Netherlands: Pruijt 2013 Urban Studies 1114. 
142  The first squatting action took place in Amsterdam in 1964 when a student newspaper criticised 
the Amsterdam Municipal Policy regarding the vacancy of buildings that had to be demolished. 
The aim of the paper was to encourage students to occupy these buildings, which succeeded 
and led to further squatter movements organized by the squatters' cooperative housing agency: 
Priemus 2011 Enhr Conference Paper 1-2. See also Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 135. 
143  Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 138. During the early 1980s Amsterdam had a waiting list for 
low-income housing of nearly 50000 people  
144  Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 135. 
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abandon their properties. Abandonment was prevented by state regulation, while the 
condition of the occupied buildings remained decent.145 In due course the courts 
became sympathetic towards the squatters and as a result of a number of decisions 
where the courts interpreted the requirement that the property must be used by 
another restrictively,146 some krakers147 of vacant buildings escaped criminal 
prosecution. A result of the conflict between landowners and krakers of vacant 
buildings was the enactment of the Leegstandwet.148 It has been argued that the Act 
was founded on the idea that the socio-economically weak should be enabled to 
acquire a scarce primary resource, namely housing, specifically in the situation 
where the premises stood unjustly vacant.149 It therefore aimed to protect a certain 
vulnerable group in society, indicating that the Act's point of departure was ethical.150  
The way in which the Act operated and its direct consequences could be divided into 
three sections, namely a) all property owners were obliged to keep the state 
informed regarding the vacancy of buildings, while this information had to be logged 
into a vacancy register;151 b) the state was compelled to claim vacant buildings and 
ensure that the buildings were put to use;152 and c) there was a positive duty on the 
                                        
145  Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 147. The state managed to prevent a general decay of buildings 
(and neighborhoods) by implementing controlled urban renewal programmes.  
146  In HR 2 februari 1971, 1971 NJ 1971, 385, the Hoge Raad held that the property must be in 
effective use in order to render the squatter's invasion and consequential occupation unlawful. 
147  Kraker is the Dutch phrase for squatter. 
148  Act 21 of May 1981. Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 50. 
149  In the Middelburg (Arr Rb Middelburg 1 October 1980 and 24 December 1980, NJ 1981, 374) 
decision the court held that even though the unauthorised invasion of private property amounts 
to an interference with the owner's entitlements, such an invasion is not necessarily unlawful. 
The reason was that the right to property is inherently restricted, which means that any 
interference with the right to property can be justified if the owner makes use of his rights in a 
socially irresponsible manner. An example is where the owner leaves his property vacant for 
extended periods of time without good reason while there are dire housing shortages. In such 
circumstances squatting can be perceived as lawful if it is carried out in a socially responsible 
manner. The point of departure is that owners can exercise their rights within the confines of the 
law, which also means that the protection of their rights might in certain circumstances be 
limited in the light of social concerns: Van der Walt 1991 337. It has been argued that the 
concept of property should be differentiated on the basis of the different social functions that 
property objects may have. Land, and specifically residential property, might therefore be 
subject to greater inherent restrictions and obligations, while the owner of vacant buildings 
might enjoy very limited protection against homeless squatters, especially if the owner left the 
buildings vacant for speculation purposes and if there is a housing shortage: Van der Walt 1991 
Recht en Kritiek 338. See also Hoogenboom "Rechtsbeskerming" 57. 
150  Hoogenboom "Rechtsbeskerming" 50-51. 
151  Chap II, ss 5-6 of the Act. 
152  Chap III, ss 7-11. 
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state to exercise and improve control over vacant buildings by means of a simplified 
claims procedure.153 The aim of the Act was to discourage owners from leaving their 
properties vacant, especially in areas where there were serious housing shortages,154 
although it also discouraged the unlawful invasion of registered vacant buildings.155  
In essence, the Act provided that the owners of vacant buildings156 had to register 
their properties with the local authority, who could claim those empty buildings and 
make them available to homeless persons on the basis of short-term leases.157 It is 
therefore clear that the Act affected three parties, namely the local authority, the 
owner and the home-seeker.158 The obligation to register the vacancy of the building 
rested on the owner, who had to report its vacancy within a month of its becoming 
vacant.159 The advantage of registering the property was that unlawful occupiers 
would be prosecuted and evicted.160 Registered buildings were therefore regulated 
strictly in the sense that they were safeguarded from krakers.161 
The state's decision to claim a vacant building had to be directed at the owner, who 
could make objections against the proposed claim. The objections had to be taken 
into account by the state, although the state also took into account the interests of 
home-seekers and the remaining public interest in promoting an equal distribution of 
                                        
153  Kleyn "Opening" 9-10. 
154  Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 50. 
155  Van der Walt 1991 Recht en Kritiek 336. Registered buildings enjoyed protection against 
unlawful invasion: Wemes "De Leegstand" 42. 
156  The vacancy of the building referred to the actual (feitlijke) vacancy: Besemer "Uitvoering" 27. 
157  Besemer "Uitvoering" 26; Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 50; Van der Walt 1991 Recht en Kritiek 336. 
The state therefore made the vacant properties available periodically.  
158  Hoogenboom "Rechtsbeskerming" 50. 
159  Besemer "Uitvoering" 27. Failure to register the property could lead to a punishable offence: 29. 
The maximum punishment was either (the then) ƒ 25000 or four weeks in custody. If the owner 
failed to register the property, a home-seeker could report the vacant building and request that 
the state nominate him as tenant. The owner would still be prosecuted and if the owner did not 
accept the home-seeker as his new tenant, the state could still claim the property and make it 
available to the home-seeker. In such a case the property would be reported in the vacancy 
register and enjoy protection against krakers: Wemes "De Leegstand" 41-42. 
160  Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 50. The unlawful occupation of registered buildings was therefore a 
crime, although these unlawful occupiers could also be sued on the basis of civil proceedings 
without citation: Van der Walt 1991 Recht en Kritiek 336. The town mayor was obliged to ensure 
that the eviction took place, which was also in line with the overall goal of an effective 
distribution of residential space: Wemes "De Leegstand" 44. 
161  Registered buildings basically formed part of the distribution stock and if one of these buildings 
was unlawfully occupied the state could evict the kraker by relying on the Woonruimtewet in 
order to make the premises available to a home-seeker: Wemes "De Leegstand" 43.  
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residential space.162 A decision not to claim vacant property was the exception rather 
than the rule,163 and once it was decided that the property should be claimed the 
fact had to be indicated on the register.164 Properties could be removed from the 
register either when the owner reported that he/she would make use of the 
property, and the state approved this proposition, or when the property was in fact 
claimed by the state. Once the property had been claimed and the whole claims 
procedure had been finalized, the state had to identify an "urgent" home-seeker(s) 
and enable that person(s) to take occupation.165 In terms of the Act, the legal 
relationship that was created among the owner, occupier and state was unclear, 
although the assumption was that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the 
state and the occupiers, while the owner was absent from this agreement.166 
Nevertheless the owner was in consultation with the local authority regarding the 
temporary use of the property.167 In addition, a number of municipalities bought the 
buildings that were being occupied by the squatters and consequently legalised the 
occupiers' occupation.168 Most of the buildings were given to established housing 
associations, which concluded lease agreements with the squatters. Part of this 
legalisation process required negotiations between the squatters and the state, 
                                        
162  Besemer "Uitvoering" 32-33. If the owner decided to alienate the property during the claims 
process, the claim would also bind the successor in title. 
163  In terms of Chap V of the Act, owners of vacant buildings could, in exceptional circumstances, 
escape the claims procedure if they could indicate that the property would be let on a short-term 
basis. The owner had to show that the property was in fact registered; that there was no other 
use for it; that it would be sufficiently occupied; and, if renovations were required, that such 
renovations would constitute a profound restoration. If the owner satisfied all the requirements 
he could apply for a permit allowing him to lease the property on a short-term basis, although 
not exceeding a maximum of three years. The maximum rent had to be determined by the local 
authority: Wemes "De Leegstand" 47. This allowance in terms of which the owner could lease his 
property was beneficial to both the home-seeker (the short-term tenant) and the owner. The 
home-seeker’s position in acquiring housing could not be compromised as a result of the fact 
that he had entered into a short-term lease, while the owner's property was taken into 
occupation, remained occupied and was kept free of damage. In addition, the owner acquired 
the rental income while he could negotiate with prospective buyers: Wemes "De Leegstand" 48. 
164  Besemer "Uitvoering" 30. There had to be a good reason not to claim vacant property. 
165  Wemes "De Leegstand" 46. Communication between the owner of the vacant building and the 
chosen occupier generally did not take place before the whole procedure was completed. 
166  Hoogenboom "Rechtsbeskerming" 54-55. 
167  Besemer "Uitvoering" 28.  
168  The municipality of Amsterdam bought two hundred buildings that were unlawfully occupied: 
Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 139. 
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which often led to the state making repairs to some of the unlawfully occupied 
buildings to ensure that the buildings remained habitable.169 
It had been argued that the Act introduced a positive duty on owners to use their 
private property, while the "reflexive effect" of this duty was to render the unlawful 
occupation of vacant buildings lawful.170 The effect of the Act was to place a higher 
value on the use value of the property than the exchange value. During housing 
shortages the Act allowed self-help in the sense that homeless persons could identify 
unregistered vacant buildings and appropriate them for housing purposes. This also 
shows how the Act forced property owners to take responsibility and ensure that 
their property was put to use either by themselves or by the state.  
4.2 English law – Empty Dwelling Management Orders 
In English law, a local housing authority may acquire houses or buildings, which may 
be made suitable for housing purposes, either by agreement or compulsorily with 
the authorisation of the Secretary of State.171 One of the main uses of the local 
authority's compulsory purchase power is to acquire land for housing development, 
empty properties to be made available for housing purposes, or dilapidated houses 
with a view to improving them as housing accommodation. Once acquired, the land 
or property is often disposed to Housing Associations or owner-occupiers, both 
                                        
169  Pruijt 2003 Int J Urban Reg Res 139. 
170  Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 50. However, it was unlikely that the effect of the Act would be to 
create a subjective right to housing. See also De Vries, Schutte and Vranken Eigendom 88, 
where the authors argue that even though the Act placed an obligation on owners to either use 
or register their buildings, the Act did not create a right to housing. The Act did also not create a 
material right for squatters to take occupation of vacant buildings. 
171  S 17 of the Housing Act 1985. The latter are generally referred to as compulsory purchase orders 
(CPOs) and are similar to expropriations in South Africa. Compulsory purchase orders should be 
made only if doing so is in the public interest, and the authorising authority must be sure that 
the purpose of the CPO justifies the interference with human rights of those affected, including 
Art 1 of the First Protocol and Art 8 (in the case of a dwelling) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Each case should be considered on its own merits and the acquiring authority 
must indicate that it requires the land immediately to secure the purpose for which it was 
acquired. Specifically land should be acquired by the state only if the public benefit would 
undoubtedly outweigh the private loss: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7691/191888 
paras 17-19 of Part 1. 
J STRYDOM AND S VILJOEN  PER / PELJ 2014(17)4 
1245 
forming part of the private sector.172 The issue regarding empty homes was raised in 
May 2004 when the office of the Deputy Prime Minister published a Consultation 
Paper highlighting the problems associated with vacant buildings.173 In terms of the 
paper an empty home is a wasted asset in the sense that the owner can receive an 
income from it by either selling or letting it, people are in need of housing, and the 
community has to bare the burdens created by empty dwellings.174 The existing 
statutory powers that have generally been used by local authorities to ensure the re-
occupation of empty dwellings are compulsory purchase orders175 and enforced 
sales.176 However, the paper indicated that these powers do not always provide an 
effective means of securing the re-use of empty dwellings, because they involve 
complicated legal procedures that are both time consuming and resource intensive 
for the local authority.177 It was concluded that these powers may be over-
prescriptive and that a change in ownership is not necessarily required to address 
the issue of empty dwellings.178  
What followed was the enactment of the Housing Act 2004, and in April 2006 empty 
dwelling management orders (EDMOs) were introduced into the Act. In terms of 
Chapter 2 the local authority can make both interim and final EDMOs in respect of 
                                        
172  S 18(2) of the Housing Act 1985; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7691/191888 
para 4 of Appendix E. See also Joyce v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and 
the Regions [2002] EWHC 2213 (Admin) paras 18-20. 
173  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2003 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138826.pdf. The private 
sector accounted for more than eighty per cent of the empty homes, while half of these homes 
had been vacant for more than six months. 
174  In 2010, 8.1 per cent of all households (roughly 1.75 million) were on local authority waiting lists 
for housing, while in 2012 it was estimated that there were 930 000 empty homes in the United 
Kingdom: Baker 2012 Journal of Housing Law 45.  
175  In terms of Annexure 7, the local authority should first aim to purchase the property from the 
owner by agreement. The compulsory purchase order may be exercised in terms of the 
empowering legislation only.  
176  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2003 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138826.pdf 21. Enforced 
sale is described in Annexure 7 of the paper.  
177  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2003 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138826.pdf 22. A 
compulsory purchase order requires a change in ownership and can therefore take up to two 
years to be finalised.  
178  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2003 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138826.pdf 50. 
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certain dwellings.179 An interim EDMO enables the local authority, with the consent 
of the proprietor,180 to take certain steps to ensure that a dwelling becomes and 
continues to be occupied, while a final EDMO merely secures the interim order.181 
Interim EDMOs can be made in relation to dwellings that are wholly unoccupied, 
which means that no part is occupied either lawfully or unlawfully. The Act also 
requires that the local authority must acquire authorization from a residential 
property tribunal to make an interim EDMO.182 In essence, an EDMO gives the local 
authority the right to possess and manage the property, provided that it has 
acquired authorization from the tribunal.183 The tribunal must ensure that the 
application does not fall within one of the exceptions184 and that all the requirements 
are met, namely that a) the dwelling has been wholly unoccupied for at least six 
months; b) there is no reasonable prospect that the dwelling will become occupied 
in the near future; c) the award of an interim EDMO will result in a reasonable 
prospect that the dwelling will become occupied; and d) the local authority has 
complied with section 133(3) of the Act.185 The abovementioned requirements were 
amended in 2011 to increase the period that the property had to be empty from six 
months to two years, and to oblige the local authority to notify the proprietor three 
months before making an application for an interim EDMO. These amendments aim 
                                        
179   A "dwelling" is defined as either a building or part of a building intended to be occupied as a 
separate dwelling: s 132(4) of the Housing Act 2004. 
180  The "proprietor" is either the person who has the freehold estate in the dwelling or, if the 
dwelling is let under one or more leases with an unexpired term of  seven years or more, the 
lessee with the shortest unexpired term. One should note that the proprietor cannot be a public 
sector body: s 133(2) of the Act. 
181  S 132(2)-(3) of the Housing Act 2004. 
182  S 133(1)-(2) of the Housing Act 2004. This application may include another application in terms 
of paragraph 22 of Schedule 7 of the Act determining a lease or licence of the dwelling: s 133(6) 
of the Housing Act 2004. 
183  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 490. 
184  The Secretary of State made the Housing (Empty Dwelling Management Orders) (Prescribed 
Exceptions and Requirements) (England) Order 2006, which came into force on 6 April 2006. 
The following are some of the dwellings that are excluded: a) a dwelling that has been occupied 
principally by the proprietor and is unoccupied because he is temporarily resident elsewhere, he 
is either receiving or providing personal care, or he is serving in the armed forces; b) a dwelling 
used as a holiday home; c) a dwelling that is on the market for sale or letting; d) a dwelling that 
is usually occupied by the employee of the proprietor; and e) a dwelling that is mortgaged where 
the mortgagee is in possession of the dwelling.  
185  S 134(1)-(2) of the Housing Act 2004.  
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to balance the rights of the owners with the interests of the community more 
carefully.186 
Once an interim EDMO is in force, the local authority must ensure that the dwelling 
becomes and continues to be occupied, while they should also manage the dwelling, 
pending the making of a final EDMO.187 At this stage, the authority has the right to 
take possession of the dwelling; it can do anything with the dwelling that the 
proprietor would be able to do and may create an interest in the dwelling which has 
all the incidents of a leasehold.188 During an interim EDMO, the proprietor is not 
entitled to rent or any payments made by the occupiers, may not exercise any 
powers with respect to the management of the dwelling, and may not create any 
interests in respect of the dwelling.189 
An interim EDMO is valid for only twelve months,190 while a final EDMO lasts for 
seven years.191 If the local authority concludes that there are no further steps that 
they can take to secure that the dwelling becomes occupied, the interim EDMO will 
either be revoked or replaced by a final EDMO.192 It will likely be replaced by a final 
EDMO if the local authority considers such an order necessary to secure occupation. 
A final EDMO therefore does not require the approval of the tribunal.193 The local 
authority may also make a final EDMO if the dwelling remains unoccupied despite 
their efforts to secure occupation.194 This means that the local authority will take all 
the necessary steps to come to an agreement with the owner that the property 
should be brought back into use. However, if the owner is uncooperative, an interim 
EDMO may be revoked and replaced with a final EDMO. Once the local authority has 
                                        
186  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 490. The amendments were set in a November 
2011 Report by the Department of Communities and Local Government. 
187  S 135(1)-(3) of the Act. 
188  Para 2 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. The authority can also create a license or apply 
for an order from the tribunal determining a license or leasehold.  
189  Para 4 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. The same principles apply in relation to final 
EDMOs: para 12 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. 
190  Para 1 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. 
191  Para 9 of of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004; Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
490. A final EDMO is considered a local land charge and the authority can apply to have it 
registered with the Chief Land Registrar: para 10 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. 
192  S 135(4) of the Act. 
193  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 490. 
194  S 136(1) of the Act. S 136(2) is similar to s 136(1), although it regulates the making of a new 
final EDMO to replace a final EDMO. 
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decided to make a final EDMO, it no longer requires permission from the owner to 
place a tenant in the property.195 The authority may take possession of the dwelling 
and create an interest, similar to a leasehold, in the property or a right, similar to a 
licence, to occupy part of the dwelling.196 The local authority may decide on a below-
market rent, provided that the rent covers the maintenance costs, while the owner is 
entitled to the balance. The owner is entitled to sell the property while an EDMO is 
in force, although the tenants' tenure rights will be protected, and the local authority 
will refuse to revoke the EDMO if the owner owes anything to the authority.197 
The local authority must consider the interests of the community and the effect that 
the final EDMO will have on the rights of both the proprietor and third parties when 
considering the making of a final EDMO. A final EDMO must contain a management 
scheme explaining how the local authority will carry out its duties and manage the 
property.198  
The EDMO regime mandates local authorities to undertake the management of 
private property that has been left empty for more than six (now twelve) months 
and make it available for housing purposes to social tenants. The underlying 
relationship between the state and home-seekers is therefore a landlord-tenant 
relationship, while the state also has to take responsibility for furniture, fittings and 
the required fixtures.199 It has been argued that EDMOs are closer to a type of 
confiscation for social utility purposes, rather than regulation. These interferences 
with owners' property rights can be justified on the basis that they reflect the socio-
economic consequences of negligent private owners "who fail to carry out their basic 
stewardship responsibilities in respect of land, thus providing a signal to the 
landowner of the potential danger that the land could become economically and 
physically sterile."200 The EDMO regime affirms the state as the arbiter of limited 
                                        
195  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 490. 
196  Para 10 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004. The authority may also apply to the tribunal for 
an order determining a licence or lease. This is done in terms of para 22 of Schedule 7 of the 
Housing Act 2004. 
197  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 490. 
198  See para 13 of Schedule 7 of the Housing Act 2004 for the full list of compulsory and optional 
inclusions in such a management scheme. 
199  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 489. 
200  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 489. 
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resources, while private owners are portrayed as merely recipients of their property 
rights. This means that their property rights can be regulated by the state with 
greater ease.201  
5 Conclusion 
The direction that the courts have recently taken in eviction disputes is to grant 
suspended eviction (and consequential relocation) orders, while forcing the state to 
provide emergency housing alternatives on an interim basis. These orders are 
generally intended to protect the most vulnerable from being rendered homeless, 
although they indirectly also suggest that landowners' rights would be unjustifiably 
restricted in the absence of such an order. The constitutional analysis of Blue 
Moonlight, Modderklip and Olivia Road shows that each case will have to be decided 
with reference to the relevant circumstances (specifically pertaining to the parties 
involved) and that in some instances an eviction order may fail to provide a sufficient 
solution from a section 26(1) and 25(1) perspective. However, any decision that 
effectively results in the indefinite seizure of land for housing purposes in conflict 
with section 25(1) (such as in Modderklip) should be avoided. In this regard there 
may be instances where an eviction order cannot be granted or enforced and where 
it may be necessary to protect property rights by way of a liability rule 
(constitutional damages or an equalization payment) instead of a property rule (an 
enforceable eviction order).  
The constitutional analysis of Blue Moonlight in particular illustrates the courts' 
contribution to creating access to housing for indigent persons, but it also clearly 
shows the limits of the courts' power in creating adequate remedies for difficult 
cases, while pointing towards the duty of the state to step in and provide long-term 
solutions. This could be done by means of existing mechanisms, including its power 
to expropriate property for housing purposes,202 or the creation of new statutory 
measures.   
                                        
201  Pascoe 2012 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 489. 
202  The Property Valuation Bill GN 1085 in GG 36993 of 1 November 2013 streamlines the valuation 
process in instances where a state organ intends to purchase land for land reform or any other 
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The legislatures in both the Netherlands and England have responded to high 
vacancy rates amidst housing shortages by empowering the state to take acquisition 
of these buildings and make them available to home-seekers. These laws affected 
only the owners' use rights, although the extent of the deprivations in both instances 
was severe when considering the duration thereof and the fact that no form of 
damages or compensation was due to the affected landowners. Surely part of the 
purpose of these laws was to address housing shortages, while the real intention 
underlying these laws was to bring to book negligent landowners who left their 
properties vacant for socially unjust reasons. In comparison, the eradication of the 
current South African housing shortage that is experienced by the most vulnerable 
and poor must be a state priority and the state should employ all necessary means 
to give content to section 26(1) of the Constitution. Unlawfully occupied inner-city 
buildings that are in a derelict state are the ideal buildings for the state to 
expropriate for the following reasons: a) the state would acquire the buildings as 
landowner, take physical control thereof and consequently be able to upgrade the 
buildings for future housing purposes; b) the permanent eviction and relocation of 
the occupiers would be side-stepped; c) the occupiers would eventually (after the 
buildings have been upgraded) continue living where they established their social 
circles and in close proximity to their place of work; and d) the compensation for the 
expropriation would be minimal in the light of the fact that the owners abandoned 
both their buildings and their municipal rates and taxes responsibilities. Evidently, 
the state would have to invest state funds to upgrade these buildings, which is a 
foreseen expenditure in the light of its overall housing obligation. The difference is 
that the state would now allocate funds to increase its housing stock in the inner 
cities, where individuals clearly need to live, instead of building free-standing houses 
                                                                                                                          
purpose. This bill read with the Policy Framework for Land Acquisition and Land Valuation in a 
Land Reform Context and for the Establishment of the Office of the Valuer-General as 18 
October 2012 (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/legislation-and-policies/file/1368) reiterates that the 
willing-buyer-willing-seller principle has in some instances posed an obstacle to the land reform 
process and it suggests criteria for identifying and valuing properties for land reform. In 
particular, the policy emphasises that government should make greater use of its expropriation 
powers in the land reform context and that compensation for expropriated properties will be 
determined with reference to the factors set out in section 25(3) of the Constitution. It is 
desirable that government should adopt a similar approach in respect of vacant and decaying 
urban structures that could be used to alleviate the housing shortage.  
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outside the parameters of the city. Of course, both well-maintained and deteriorated 
buildings that have been left vacant for socially unjust reasons should also come 
under the radar of the state as possible housing solutions, although the state should 
carefully scrutinise each case to determine if it would be constitutionally permissible 
to expropriate the property. 
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